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Abstract 
This study examines the determinants of independent director compensation in China, with 
particular interest in the impacts of state ownership and legal institution. Controlling for the 
characteristics of directors, boards, and firms, we find independent director compensation is 
positively related to attributes of director’s human and social capital such as education, effort, 
professional expertise, and connection (guanxi). We show that independent director pay is 
determined differently across the ownership structures. Independent directors are paid less in 
companies owned by local government units and the independent directors in such companies are 
paid less in a region with more developed legal institution. This study contributes to the limited 
literature on independent director compensation by extending beyond the market economies to 
explore the determinants of independent director compensation in a transitional economy like 
China. It also adds to the literature on legal institutions by examining the impacts of legal 
development on compensation. Finally, this study informs the public of the current compensation 
practice, which will facilitate future policy making. 
 
Keywords: Compensation; Guanxi; Legal Institution; State Ownership  
JEL Classification: M41, M52 
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State Ownership, Legal Institution, and Independent Director Compensation:  
An Exploratory Study in China 
 
1. Introduction 
The function of independent directors is to enhance corporate governance, and 
compensation can influence independent director behavior. Despite its importance in motivating 
director’s performance, the literature on non-executive director compensation is still limited, and 
much of the previous research has been conducted in the US setting (Hahn and Lasfer, 2011). 
Very little is known about non-executive director compensation in transitional economies. This 
paper examines the determinants of independent director compensation in China. Owing to 
China’s distinctive cultural and institutional background, western theories may not always apply 
to Chinese phenomena, and research in Chinese settings is important theoretically. From the start 
of the economic reform in 1978 to 2013, China’s trade volume has increased from US$20.6 
billion to US$4,160, billion (Soong, 2014). As Chinese economy continues to grow, China will 
become more interdependent with many countries worldwide, and it is important to learn more 
about China for the research to be ‘globally relevant’ (Peng, 2004).  
Although it is commonly believed that independent director compensation is determined 
at the firm level, recent research in the western settings shows that independent director 
compensation is determined by director’s individual factors (see e.g., Cordeiro et al., 2000). 
Informed by the previous studies, we investigate the determinants of independent director 
compensation at the director-firm-year observation level. In this paper, we test whether director 
human capital is priced in a transitional economy like China. We focus on certain aspects of 
director human capital, i.e., education, effort, and professional expertise. For the sake of brevity, 
below, we use the word ‘human capital’ to collectively refer to these various aspects of human 
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capital. Additionally, we investigate whether directors are compensated for their social capital 
such as connections (guanxi). We also investigate the impacts of state ownership and legal 
institution on independent director compensation. In 1978, China began an economic reform, and 
the market-oriented policies have been adopted (Das 2012). Coinciding with the economic reform 
was the legal reform to enhance the legal institutions and to develop the legal system that 
supported economic growth (Clarke, 2007). After more than three decades of the reform 
processes, both the market and legal institutions have been enhanced; however, the degrees of 
market and legal development still vary significantly across regions (Wang et al., 2008). China 
thus provides an excellent research setting to investigate the impacts of legal development, 
without the cross-country confounding factors which are present in the previous international 
studies. 
Our main findings are as follows. First, consistent with the previous studies in market 
economies, we find that independent directors are compensated for their human capital 
(professional expertise, education, and effort) in China. Directors are also compensated for their 
social capital (connections or guanxi). Second, we show that director attributes and organizational 
context interact to determine independent director compensation. Some attributes of an 
independent director are likely to be more valuable for a certain type of organization and hence 
tend to be compensated more in such an organization. In particular, we find that director 
professional expertise and effort tend to be more valuable in a privately-owned enterprise. Third, 
with the socialist legacy, social harmony and equality are important, and pay disparity is a 
concern in China (Firth et al., 2010; Lin and Lu, 2009; Lum, 2006). Our results show that the 
social equity pressure tends to have stronger impact on an enterprise controlled by a local 
government unit than an enterprise owned by the central government or a privately-owned 
enterprise, possibly because of the local cadre responsibility system imposed on local government 
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officials (Minzner, 2009). We find that independent director pay is more suppressed in a local 
state-owned enterprise in a region with more developed legal institution.  
Our study contributes to the limited literature on independent director compensation by 
extending beyond market economies to explore the determinants of independent director 
compensation in a transitional economy like China. Our study also adds to the literature on legal 
institutions by examining the impacts of legal development on compensation. By using data from 
China, a huge country with much variation in the degree of legal development, we can avoid the 
cross-country confounding factors which are present in the previous international studies. In 
addition to the research contribution, this study is useful for policy making. Although both 
independent director and compensation are important governance tools, there is currently no 
official guideline on independent director compensation in many countries (Hahn and Lasfer, 
2011). A policy maker may be hesitant to impose specific guidelines or requirements because 
little is known about non-executive director compensation and its impacts. By informing the 
public of the current practice, our study can facilitate future policy making, which will improve 
corporate governance in the long run. Our findings also inform the industry of the current 
compensation practice so that companies can learn from their peers to improve their remuneration 
policies. 
 
2. Theoretical Framework and Hypotheses 
2.1 Independent Directors in China 
The China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) issued its ‘Guideline for 
Introducing Independent Directors to the Board of Directors of Listed Companies’ in 2001, which 
requires that at least one third of the directors must be independent by June 30, 2003, and that 
independent directors must constitute at least half of the compensation, audit, and nomination 
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committees if the companies have them (Clarke, 2006; Xi, 2006). The CSRC, however, did not 
issue a guideline regarding director compensation. Equity incentive for independent directors is 
not used much in China; in most cases, independent directors are compensated in terms of cash 
allowances (Liu and Fong, 2010).  
In the western settings, non-executive directors play three important roles: monitoring, 
counselling and facilitating the acquisition of necessary resources (Hahn and Lasfer, 2011). 
While previous research suggests that independent directors in Chinese firms are valued for their 
roles as a business facilitator or advisor (Clarke, 2006), it appears that firms do not hire them to 
monitor (Xi, 2006). The nature of agency problems is different in China. Most of the listed 
companies in China are either state-owned or family-owned (Amit et al., 2009). With powerful 
controlling shareholders, the agency problems include both the agency problems between major 
shareholders and minority shareholders and between shareholders and managers (Clarke, 2006). 
Although the CSRC guideline seems to be successful in ensuring the presence of independent 
directors on board, in practice whether the guideline can actually improve the monitoring of top 
management or the protection of minority shareholders remains doubtful (Clarke, 2006; Li, 2010). 
The ineffectiveness in monitoring can be attributed to the fact that a vast majority of independent 
director nominations are done by the shareholders and managers, and it is common that those 
appointed are social friends of the controlling shareholders and managers (Qiang, 2003). This 
implies that independent directors may not be able to effectively monitor the managers or major 
shareholders who do them a favor by appointing them (Tan and Wang, 2007). Managers and 
major shareholders control not only the nomination but also the compensation of independent 
directors (Tan and Wang, 2007). In practice, compensation is designed by the board, subject to 
approval by shareholders; since independent directors are outnumbered by inside directors, the 
compensation is in effect determined by managers and controlling shareholders (Xi, 2006).  
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Overall, it appears that the roles of independent directors in China can be better explained 
by the resource dependence perspectives (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978) in which the roles of 
independent directors are to counsel and to help with resource acquisition rather than the agency 
theory (Jensen and Meckling, 1976) in which the role of independent directors is to monitor. 
Below, we use the resource dependence perspective to develop our hypotheses.  
 
2.2 Human Capital, Social Capital and Compensation 
According to the resource dependence theory, the role of board of directors is to provide 
resources such as advice, counsel, and connections to help a firm survive and to improve firm 
performance (Hillman and Dalziel, 2003). The importance of directors in affecting corporate 
performance has been well-documented in the literature. For example, a firm led by a chairperson 
with greater education and professional expertise tends to perform better (Chan et al., 2010; 
Cheng et al., 2010). Management’s education is found to improve Chinese firms’ operating and 
market performance (Kong and Zhang, 2010). While previous research based on Chinese 
independent directors is limited, Peng (2004) shows that Chinese independent directors help 
improve firm performance. If human capital can help improve firm performance, the human 
capital owner (independent director) should be rewarded. Consistently, empirical studies have 
shown that some human capital factors such as education and experience are positively related to 
compensation (e.g., Fisher and Govindarajan, 1992). 
In this paper, we focus on certain aspects of human capital, i.e., professional qualification, 
education, and effort. First, since the possession of professional qualification is a signal for 
professional expertise, we anticipate that those directors with professional qualification should be 
paid more for their human capital. Second, researchers argue that directors with academic 
background are appointed on board to portray the prestigious image of and to enhance public 
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confidence in the company (Clarke, 2006; Xi, 2006). Also, in the human capital theory, education 
helps enhance useful skills and knowledge (Becker, 1964), which leads to higher compensation 
(Fisher and Govindarajan, 1992). Finally, greater effort should be compensated by higher pay; 
otherwise, the passion and enthusiasm can be burnt out (Cordeiro et al., 2000). 
In addition to human capital, previous research shows that social capital contributes to 
firm success and improves various aspects of firm operation (Chisholm and Nielsen, 2009). 
Social capital can be defined as ‘socially valuable personal attributes and network connections’ 
(Johnson et al., 2011: 1784). Chisholm and Nielsen (2009) argue that social capital is one of the 
important intangible resources that help a company create economic rents. Both human and social 
capitals are essential resources for firm operation and value creation (Hillman and Dalziel, 2003). 
In the Chinese context, researchers find that guanxi (connection or social network) is important 
for business success (Luo et al., 2012). (Hereafter, we use the words guanxi, connections, and 
social capital interchangeably.) In a setting with weak market-support institutions like China, 
research shows that guanxi enhances firm performance (Peng and Luo, 2000), firm valuation 
(Tang et al., 2013), market expansion, and competitive advantages (Park and Luo, 2001).  
Previous research finds that social capital is rewarded in China, i.e., guanxi has positive 
impacts on the income of urban Chinese workers (Knight and Yueh, 2008). If guanxi is rewarded 
for other employees, it should be rewarded for independent directors as well. Since guanxi is 
useful for a firm, a firm is expected to be willing to pay more to attract a well-connected director. 
We thus anticipate greater pay for an independent director with greater connections.  
Hypothesis 1: Ceteris paribus, the compensation for independent directors is positively 
related to their human capital and social capital. 
 
2.3 Ownership Structure and Compensation 
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According to the contingency framework developed by Filatotchev and Allcock (2010), 
the organizational context and institutional environment should be considered to better explain 
compensation practices. One of the distinctive features of the Chinese economy is the dominance 
of state ownership. We anticipate that state ownership, especially ownership by local government, 
suppresses independent director compensation. In China, social harmony and equality are 
culturally and politically cherished (Lin and Lu, 2009). Among other factors such as corruption, 
income inequality leads to social unrests (Lum, 2006). Surveys show that Chinese workers are 
sensitive to pay inequality, which is reported as one of the main reasons for leaving a job, and 
many senior managers indicate that they are reluctant to accept high pay in anticipation that the 
pay gap may upset colleagues and other employees (Lin and Lu, 2009). Pay disparity is 
particularly a concern in state-owned enterprises (SOEs thereafter) (SCMP, 2007). Chinese 
executive compensation appears to be restrained by social equity pressure (Lin and Lu, 2009; 
Firth et al., 2010); a CEO of an SOE tends to receive less cash compensation (Adithipyangkul et 
al., 2011). 
While SOEs are often lumped together in previous studies, recent research shows that the 
types of state ownership matters; firm performance (Chen et al., 2009), auditor choice (Wang et 
al., 2008), and management compensation (Lin and Lu, 2009), for example, are determined by 
whether an SOE is owned by central government (a central SOE thereafter) or by local 
government (a local SOE thereafter). Following the previous studies, we investigate whether 
independent director compensation is determined by the types of state ownership. We anticipate 
that pay inequality concerns affect independent director compensation more significantly in a 
local SOE than a central SOE due to the nature of the local cadre responsibility system imposed 
on local government officials, as explained below. 
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From 1979, local government officials have been evaluated based on a set of quantitative 
performance measures such as GDP growth, foreign investment, and birth rate; their career 
prospects, bonuses, sanctions, and dismissal are linked to the performance evaluation results 
(Minzner, 2009). Among the performance measures used, social order is important because it is 
often classified as a ‘priority target with veto power’, meaning that ‘[f]ailure to attain these 
targets unilaterally cancels out all positive work performance in other fields’ (Minzner, 2009, p. 
68). The local government official’s pressure to avoid social unrests is exacerbated by the 
frequent use of collective rewards and sanctions, in which all the members of the units (not just 
an individual) are rewarded or sanctioned for meeting or missing the performance targets, 
respectively (Minzner, 2009). Even though the central government officers may also be subject to 
similar performance evaluation, previous research shows that the evaluators tend to be more 
lenient and show favoritism towards an officer/an SOE in a higher political rank in both target 
setting and performance evaluation in China (Du et al., 2012). Because the local government 
ranks lower than the central government, a local government unit is expected to be under greater 
pressure from the performance evaluation system. 
Based on the previous research discussed above, the local government units appear to be 
under greater pressure to control social unrests than the central government units. Because 
income inequality leads to social unrests (Lum, 2006), to reduce the chance of social upheavals, 
the local government should not allow its SOEs to set director pay too much greater than other 
employees. In fact, a previous Chinese study shows that management pay is less suppressed in 
central SOEs than local SOEs (Lin and Lu, 2009). Because the pressure to lower pay disparity 
appears to be stronger in a local SOE than a central SOE, we hypothesize that independent 
director pay is lower in a local SOE than in a central SOE.   
10 
 
Hypothesis 2: Ceteris paribus, the compensation for independent directors is lower in a 
local state-owned enterprise than in a central state-owned enterprise. 
In addition to the direct impact on the level of compensation, we anticipate that 
government affiliation affects the relationship between compensation and director human capital 
and social capital. This is because SOEs tend to receive preferential treatments from the 
government so that they need to rely less on independent directors for success. Government-
affiliated firms receive preferential treatments in the input markets (Li, 1996). Bank loans and 
shareholders’ funds are also more readily accessible for SOEs (Brandt and Li, 2003), and SOEs 
have lower probability of financial distress (Wang and Deng, 2006). In case of disputes, the 
government-affiliated firms are better protected (Li, 1996). SOEs also tend to have better credit in 
the capital market because of the financial insurance provided by the government (government 
bailout) (Wang et al., 2008). With these competitive advantages, SOEs need to rely less on its 
independent directors for success while the opposite is true for privately-owned enterprises 
(POEs). Connections with other business are also found to have stronger positive impact on firm 
performance for a non-SOE than for an SOE (Peng and Luo, 2000). With greater benefit expected 
from independent directors, a POE is expected to be willing to pay more for a better director.  
Hypothesis 3: Ceteris paribus, the positive relation between compensation and human 
(social) capital of independent director is stronger in a privately-owned enterprise than in 
a state-owned enterprise. 
 
2.4 Legal Institution and Compensation 
Historically, Confucianism has shaped China’s culture and values (Han, 2013). The 
Chinese legal culture is such that law has not been primary; the Confucian principle of li (custom 
or norm) took precedence over fa (the codified, formal law imposed by the rulers) (Tucker, 2011). 
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The criminal law had been more developed than the civil law (Chen, 2003), and the law was used 
for incidents between the state and a citizen rather than between citizens themselves (Tucker, 
2011). Since the start of the economic reform in 1978, the Chinese formal legal institutions have 
been enhanced to foster economic development; legislation in important areas such as contracts, 
business organization, securities and bankruptcy has been enacted (Clarke, 2007). However, with 
relatively short history, the Chinese formal legal system is still weak (Tucker, 2011), and the 
judicial independence is still lacking (Chen, 2003). Because Chinese law is vague and imprecise 
(Tucker, 2011), legal enforcement is subject to government officer’s personal interpretations 
(Park and Luo, 2001). Many judges have no formal education or training in law, and many of 
them (especially in less developed regions) are former military officers (Chen, 2003). The 
development of legal institution is found to vary significantly across regions in China (Chen, 
2003; Wang et al., 2008).  
As discussed earlier, pay disparity can cause social unrest and dissatisfaction among 
workers or citizens (Lin and Lu, 2009; Lum, 2006). The likelihood of mass dissatisfaction is 
expected to be influenced by the regional degree of legal development. The development of legal 
institution has made citizens more aware of their legal rights, and many protests start as legal 
actions (Lum, 2006). Much of the recent social unrest can be attributed to the development of 
legal institution (Lum, 2006), and the growing legal consciousness among Chinese people (falü 
yishi) (Gallagher, 2006). Because of the local cadre responsibility system, the local government is 
pressured to minimize the chance of social unrest and mass dissatisfaction. The pressure tends to 
grow stronger as performance evaluation by citizens, such as satisfaction surveys, has gained 
more importance recently and has been adopted by more local government units (Zhou, 2010). 
Because local SOEs are under greater pressure to avoid social unrests from pay disparity, and 
because social unrest is more likely in a region with better legal development (Gallagher, 2006; 
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Lum, 2006), we anticipate that local SOES will pay their independent directors less in a region 
with greater legal development. 
Hypothesis 4: Ceteris paribus, the compensation for independent directors in a local 
state-owned enterprise is lower in a region with better legal development. 
 
3. Research Method 
3.1 Sample and Data Collection 
We examine firms from non-finance sectors which are listed on the Shanghai Stock 
Exchange and the Shenzhen Stock Exchange over the sample period between 2005 and 2009. Our 
sample consists of 1,508 firms, with 15,523 director-firm-year observations. We collect our data 
(board information, ownership structure, compensation and director demographic information 
such as education, professional qualification, gender, age, etc.) from the annual reports.  
 
3.2 Models 
We use a multivariate regression model (equation (1)) to examine the relations between 
compensation and director capital (human capital and social capital) and ownership structure as 
predicted in H1 and H2, respectively. 
 INDDirComp = 0 + 1 Director Capital + 2 Local SOE+ 3 Central SOE  
 + 4 Legal Environment Index + 5 Control+ t t Yeart + j j Industryj  (1) 
In H3, we investigate how ownership structure interacts with independent director capital 
to determine compensation. We expect the positive relation between compensation and director 
capital to be stronger in a privately-owned enterprise (POE).  
 INDDirComp = 0 + 1 Director Capital + 2 Local SOE+ 3 Central SOE  
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      + 4 Director Capital*POE + 5 Legal Environment Index 
       + 6 Control + t tYeart  + j jIndustryj    (2) 
To test H4, we separate our sample into three subsamples: local SOE, central SOE, and 
POE and run the following regression equation for each subsample. We expect 2 to be negative 
for the local SOE subsample. 
 INDDirComp = 0 + 1 Director Capital + 2  Legal Environment Index 
    + 3 Control + t tYeart  + j jIndustryj    (3) 
 
3.3 Measures 
Dependent variables. The variable INDDirComp represents the measures of independent 
director compensation: Pay and Abnormal Pay. Firstly, Pay is the log of RMB compensation to 
an independent director. Secondly, Abnormal Pay is the abnormal compensation of an 
independent director. To estimate Abnormal Pay, we run a regression of Pay on average 
compensation for inside directors (Average Inside Director Pay), firm size (Firm Size) and cost of 
living of the province where the firm is located (Living Expense): 
 Pay = α0 + β1 Average Inside Director Pay + β2 Firm Size + β3 Living Expense (4) 
Average Inside Director Pay is the log of average compensation for inside directors. Firm Size is 
measured by the log of total assets. Living Expense is the log of living consumption index of the 
region where the firm is located. The coefficients are estimated for the firms in each industry 
sector for each year over our sample period. Abnormal Pay is the difference between the fitted 
value of each run of regression for each firm and the actual pay to independent director (Pay). 
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Positive and negative values of Abnormal Pay show that the independent director is paid more 
and less than the ‘norm’ respectively.
1
 
Independent variables. Director Capital is used to refer to the human capital and social 
capital possessed by independent directors. In this study, we focus on three aspects of human 
capital, i.e., education, professional expertise, and effort, and we study one aspect of social capital, 
i.e., connections. Education, which counts the number of schooling years obtained by an 
independent director (3 years for college education, 4 years for university education, 6 years for a 
master degree and 9 years for a Ph.D. degree), is our measure of education. Title is a dummy 
coded 1 if an independent director holds a professional title (e.g., accountant, engineer, etc.) and 0 
otherwise. We use Title to measure professional expertise. SubCommittee is the log of the number 
of subcommittees (e.g., strategy development, audit, nomination, compensation, etc.) attended by 
an independent director. This is a measure of effort.    
Multi-Board, which is the log of the number of directorships held by an independent 
director, is used to measure connection (guanxi). In many previous studies (e.g., Peng and Luo, 
2000; Knight and Yueh, 2008), guanxi is measured based on replies to survey questions such as a 
question asking the respondent to rank the extensiveness of his/her guanxi. Different respondents 
can have different perceptions of guanxi extensiveness and their responses are subjective. Rather 
than measuring the extensiveness of guanxi itself, which is difficult to quantify objectively, we 
measure guanxi by measuring the outcome of guanxi. Research shows that guanxi helps provide 
job seekers with access to information about job vacancies (Zang, 2003), and jobs tend to be 
allocated to those with stronger connections than those with weak connections (Bian and Ang, 
1997). Guanxi is especially beneficial for attaining ‘soft-skill’ jobs, such as manager or director 
                                                        
1 Firth et al. (2010) use average worker’s pay and cost of living to estimate abnormal executive director pay. They 
use the term “excess pay” to refer to the positive values of abnormal pay. In this paper, we follow the methodology 
of Firth et al. (2010) to estimate the abnormal pay to examine whether the independent directors receive a pay which 
is higher or lower than the norm for their human and social capital.  
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jobs, which are non-task-specific and the performance of which is difficult to measure or monitor 
(Huang, 2008). Those with closer guanxi also tend to stay in the job longer (Hom and Xiao, 
2011). Based on these findings, a director with more extensive guanxi is expected to attain and 
retain a greater number of job positions. We use Multi-Board to capture the broadness of guanxi.    
Legal Environment Index is the index of legal development for different provinces in 
China developed by Fan and Wang (2003). The index is calculated based on (i) the percentage of 
lawyers of the provincial population, (ii) the percentage of lawsuits pursued by the courts, and (iii) 
property right protection (Wang et al., 2008). A higher index score represents more developed 
legal institution. Central SOE is a dummy coded 1 if the firm is an SOE controlled by central 
government and 0 otherwise. Local SOE is a dummy coded 1 if the firm is an SOE not controlled 
by central government and 0 otherwise. A central SOE is an SOE whose largest shareholder is a 
central government authority (such as the Ministry of Finance), while a local SOE is an SOE 
whose largest shareholder is a local government agency (such as the local offices of the Finance 
Bureau). POE is a dummy coded 1 if the firm is a privately-owned enterprise (as opposed to an 
SOE) and 0 otherwise.  We use these variables to investigate the effects of ownership structure. 
Control variables. Our control variables consist of director characteristics, board 
characteristics, and firm characteristics. Firstly, age and gender are found to be related to work 
performance (Cheng et al, 2010), and performance is shown to be related to non-executive 
director compensation (Cordeiro et al., 2000). Because age and gender are expected to be related 
to compensation, we control for director’s age and gender. Age is the age of independent director. 
Gender is a dummy coded 1 if the independent director is a female and 0 otherwise.  
In addition to director characteristics, we include board and firm characteristics as prior 
studies show that compensation is influenced by corporate governance, capital structure, and 
performance (Firth et al., 2010). Board Size is the log of the number of directors on board, and 
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Outside Director Ratio is the proportion of independent directors on board. Leverage is debt to 
assets ratio. ROA (return on total assets) is employed as a measure of firm performance. Firm Size 
(log of total assets) is our measure of firm size. In addition, an older firm which is well-
established may have more resources to pay its directors. We thus add Firm Age, the log of the 
number of years a firm is established, as a control variable. The variable, Living Expense, is also 
included to control for the living expense level of the region where the firm is located. Finally, 
Year, which represents the year dummies, and Industry, which represents the industry dummies, 
are added to control for the fixed effects through the years during the sample period across 
different industries.  
 
4. Results and Discussion 
Table 1 reports the descriptive statistics. Our sample consists of 1,508 firms with 15,523 
director-firm-year observations. In our sample, independent director annual pay ranges from 
RMB 1,000 to RMB 450,000, with a mean of RMB 46,132.94. Around 12% of the directors are 
females and the mean age is 51.73 years. Approximately, 71% of independent directors have 
professional qualifications. On average, an independent director has 4.46 years of tertiary 
education. In terms of effort and connections, an independent director sits in 1.61 subcommittees 
in the focal firm and holds 0.68 external appointments as a director (inside or independent) in 
other companies. 
------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 1 about here 
-------------------------------------------- 
Out of the total 15,523 director-firm-year observations, 45.5% belong to local SOEs while 
18.2% belong to central SOEs. The average legal environment index is 5.92, with the maximum 
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of 7.97 in Beijing and the minimum of 2.62 in Hunan. Firm size (total assets) ranges from RMB 
39.63 million to RMB 866,475 million, with a mean of RMB 7,079.2 million. The mean age of 
the sample firms is around 11 years. The return on total asset and debt to total asset ratio on 
average are about 4.37% and 49%, respectively. The board of directors consists of about 9.97 
members. The mean proportion of independent directors on board is around 36%, with a median 
of 33%, which is consistent with the CSRC’s Guideline that requires at least one third of the 
directors to be independent. 
 The correlation matrix is shown in Table 2. None of the explanatory variables are 
extremely correlated so that it is unlikely that multicollinearity is a concern for the multivariate 
analysis. 
-------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 2 about here 
-------------------------------------------- 
 Table 3 presents the results of our test of H1 and H2, i.e., whether independent director 
compensation increases with human capital and social capital, and whether independent directors 
are paid less in a local SOE. Consistent with H1, an independent director with greater human 
capital and connections is paid more. The coefficients on Multi-Board, Education, and 
SubCommittee are positive and statistically significant for both Pay and Abnormal Pay. While we 
do not find independent director compensation to be significantly related to professional expertise 
in the full sample, we find a positive and significant relationship in the local SOE subsample (to 
be discussed below). Our results are consistent with the previous studies such as Fisher and 
Govindarajan (1992) which find CEO compensation is positively related to CEO human capital. 
Our results also add to the literature on social capital and compensation. The previous evidence is 
mixed. Meyerson (1994) finds management income is positively related to social capital in 
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Sweden, while Johnson et al. (2011) conclude that there is no support for the hypothesized 
positive relationship between pay and director’s social capital in the U.S. It appears that national 
institution affects the relationship between pay and social capital. Future research may investigate 
this interesting issue further. 
 Following the contingency framework developed by Filatotchev and Allcock (2010), we 
consider the organizational context and institutional environment in China to better explain 
compensation practices. We investigate the impacts of ownership structure and regional legal 
development. In H2, we argue that due to the local cadre responsibility system (Minzner, 2009), a 
local SOE has strong motivation to suppress director pay to avoid social unrests. Consistent with 
H2, we also find the coefficients on Local SOE for Pay and Abnormal Pay are negative and 
statistically significant. For Central SOE, however, we find the positive relation is statistically 
significant for Abnormal Pay; indicating that a central SOE tends to pay its independent directors 
more than a local SOE and a POE. Our results are consistent with a study by Lin and Lu (2009), 
which finds that management pay is higher in central SOEs than local SOEs. 
-------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 3 about here 
--------------------------------------------- 
 In addition to the direct impact on the level of compensation, we anticipate that 
ownership structure affects the relationship between compensation and director capital. Because 
POEs do not receive preferential treatments from the government, we anticipate that they need to 
rely more on independent directors for survival and success and hence will be willing to pay more 
for director capital (H3). Table 4 reports the results for H3 whether the relations between 
compensation and director’s human capital and connections are stronger in a POE. While we do 
not find a POE pays more for connections (as measured by the number of external director 
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positions (Multi-Board)), we show that a POE pays more for effort and professional expertise. 
The interaction term Title*POE has positive and statistically significant coefficients of both for 
Pay and Abnormal Pay. The coefficients on SubCommittee*POE are also positive and 
statistically significant both for both pay measures. Our results are in the same vein as the 
previous US research investigating the moderating effects of firm characteristics on the relation 
between CEO pay and CEO human capital (Geletkanycz et al., 2001).
 
Contrary to our expectation, 
a POE pays less for education. Education*POE has negative and statistically significant 
coefficients for both pay measures.  
---------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 4 about here 
----------------------------------------------- 
The results from Table 4 suggest that a certain attribute of director capital may be more 
desirable in a certain type of firms. To explore this further and to test H4, we separate our sample 
into three subsamples: local SOE, central SOE, and POE. The regression analysis results are 
shown in Table 5. Panel A reports the results for the dependent variable Pay, while Panel B 
reports the results for the dependent variable Abnormal Pay.  
We hypothesize that the legal institution development is negatively related to independent 
director compensation in local SOEs. Supporting H4, we find that Legal Environment Index is 
negatively and significantly related to Pay and Abnormal Pay in the local SOE subsample. We 
also find Legal Environment Index is positively related to Pay and Abnormal Pay in POEs but is 
not significantly related to Pay and Abnormal Pay in central SOEs. Our results add to the 
previous research which documents the impacts of legal institution on various economic 
outcomes such as firm valuation, ownership structure and capital market development (La Porta 
et al., 2008).  
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In addition, we find that social capital (guanxi) appears to be desirable in all types of firms, 
the coefficients for Multi-Board are positive and statistically significant in all subsamples in 
Panel A.  While Education is positively associated with Pay for local and central SOEs, 
Education is not significantly related to Pay for POEs. In addition, while Title is not significantly 
related to Pay in SOEs, Title is positively related to Pay in POEs. We also find that local SOEs 
and POEs pay their independent directors more for effort, as measured by SubCommittee, but 
effort is not significantly related to Pay in central SOEs. Panel B shows consistent results for the 
dependent variable Abnormal Pay. Overall, our results suggest that a certain attribute of director 
capital may be more desirable in a certain type of firms, and pay appears to be determined 
differently, depending on the ownership structure. 
 
5. Conclusion 
 Given different legal and national institutions, it is questionable whether the theories and 
empirical findings based on the western market economies are valid in other settings. Previous 
research shows that some western theories and empirical findings are applicable to China (see 
e.g., Firth et al., 2010). This paper adds to the literature by exploring what determines 
independent director compensation in China. We find that independent director compensation in 
China is determined by director human capital (education, professional expertise, and effort), 
social capital (connections), ownership structure, and legal institutional environment, providing 
evidence from a transitional economy to support the resource dependence perspective and 
Filatotchev and Allcock’s (2010) contingency framework. One of the limitations of our study is 
that our study (and many of the previous studies) investigates the determinants of independent 
director compensation across firms and industries. Future research may consider a longitudinal 
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study to investigate the changes over time. These inter-temporal studies will be particularly 
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 Descriptive Statistics 
                
 Dummy  
Code = 1 
Dummy  











Pay (ln)   10.59 10.60 13.02 6.91 0.56 
Pay (RMB)   46,132.94 40,000.00 450,000.00 1,000.00 28,131.30 
Abnormal Pay   -0.09 -0.05 1.93 -3.38 0.48 
Multi-Board (ln)   0.37 0.00 1.95 0.00 0.51 
Multi-Board (position)   0.68 0.00 6.00 0.00 1.08 
Education (ln)   1.38 1.61 2.30 0.00 0.91 
Education (year)   4.46 4.00 9.00 0.00 3.36 
Title 11081 4442      
SubCommittee (ln)   0.80 1.10 1.79 0.00 0.60 
Subcommittee (position)   1.61 2.00 5.00 0.00 1.34 
Female 1902 13621      
Age (ln)   3.93 3.91 4.50 3.33 0.20 
Age (year)   51.73 50.00 90.00 28.00 10.23 
Outside Director Ratio   0.36 0.33 0.67 0.13 0.05 
Board Size (ln)   2.28 2.20 2.94 1.61 0.22 
Board Size (members)   9.97 9.00 19.00 5.00 2.24 
POE 5631 9892      
Central SOE 2829 12694      
Local SOE 7063 8460      
Legal Environment Index   5.92 6.24 7.97 2.62 1.27 
Firm Size (ln)   21.65 21.54 27.45 17.50 1.19 
Firm Size ( million RMB)   7,079.22 2,262.35 866,475.00 39.63 29,843.42 
Leverage   0.49 0.50 0.90 0.01 0.18 
ROA   0.04 0.04 1.76 -2.75 0.08 
Firm Age (ln)   2.41 2.48 3.33 0.00 0.43 
Firm Age (year)   11.06 11.00 27.00 1.00 4.36 
Living Expense (ln)   9.35 9.31 9.95 8.69 0.30 
Living Expense (RMB)   11,978.43 11,055.13 20,992.35 5,928.79 3,597.90 
                
The number of observations is 15,523. Pay is the log of compensation (in RMB) to independent director. Abnormal 
Pay is the abnormal compensation of independent director. Multi-Board is the log of the number of multiple board 
directorships held by an independent director. Education is the log of the tertiary schooling years of an independent 
director, with 3 years for college education, 4 years for university education, 6 years for master degree education, 
and 9 years for Ph.D. degree. Title is dummy coded 1 if an independent director holds a professional qualification 
(e.g., accountant, engineer, and economist). SubCommittee is the log of the number of subcommittees attended by an 
independent director. Legal Environment Index shows the degree of legal environment development of the region a 
firm is located. Female is a dummy coded 1 if an independent director is a female and 0 otherwise. Age is the log of 
the age of an independent director. POE is a dummy coded 1 if a firm is a privately-owned firm and 0 otherwise. 
Outside Director Ratio is the ratio of the number of independent directors to total number of directors. Board Size is 
the log of the number of directors on board. Central SOE is a dummy coded 1 if a firm is a central SOE. Local SOE 
is a dummy coded 1 if a firm is a local SOE. Firm Size is the log of total assets. Leverage is the debt to total asset 
ratio. ROA is the return on total assets. Firm Age is the log of firm age. Living Expense is the log of the living 





                                      
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 
                                      
1 Pay 1.00                 
2 Abnormal Pay 0.79** 1.00                
3 Multi-Board 0.10** 0.05** 1.00               
4 SubCommittee 0.05** 0.04** 0.03** 1.00              
5 Education 0.05** 0.04** 0.34** -0.05** 1.00             
6 Title 0.02** 0.04** 0.29** -0.03** 0.40** 1.00            
7 Female -0.05** -0.02** -0.07** -0.01 -0.03** -0.02** 1.00           
8 Age 0.10** 0.04** 0.01 -0.03** -0.15** 0.05** -0.10** 1.00          
9 Outside Director Ratio 0.02** -0.02** -0.01 0.01 -0.02** -0.05** -0.02* 0.03** 1.00         
10 Board Size 0.04** -0.04** -0.01 -0.07** 0.03** 0.02* -0.02** 0.04** -0.14** 1.00        
11 Central SOE 0.12** 0.03** 0.02 0.01 0.02* -0.01 -0.04** 0.03** -0.02** 0.14** 1.00       
12 Local SOE -0.06** -0.06** 0.03** 0.03** -0.03** 0.03** 0.00 0.04** -0.03** 0.11** -0.43** 1.00      
13 Legal Environment Index 0.19** -0.13** 0.02** -0.04** 0.04** -0.02 -0.02** 0.05** 0.02** -0.03** 0.09** -0.13** 1.00     
14 Firm Size 0.35** -0.08** 0.06** 0.00 0.02* 0.02* -0.04** 0.11** 0.02* 0.27** 0.22** 0.15** 0.09** 1.00    
15 Leverage 0.06** -0.03** 0.00 0.04** -0.02* 0.00 -0.02* 0.00 0.00 0.13** 0.09** 0.08** -0.09** 0.37** 1.00   
16 ROA 0.10** 0.05** 0.04** -0.06** 0.05** 0.02** 0.00 0.01 -0.02** -0.02** -0.03** -0.07** 0.03** 0.03** -0.28** 1.00  
17 Firm Age 0.02** -0.01 0.03** 0.21** -0.07** -0.03** 0.02* -0.01 -0.01 0.01 -0.01 0.18** -0.07** 0.13** 0.19** -0.13** 1.00 
18 Living Expense 0.25** -0.14** 0.06** 0.10** 0.00 -0.04** -0.02** 0.06** 0.07** -0.04** 0.07** -0.16** 0.72** 0.06** -0.08** 0.01 0.03** 
                                       
Number of observations is 15,523. Pay is the log of compensation (in RMB) to independent director. Abnormal Pay is the abnormal compensation of 
independent director. Multi-Board is the log of the number of multiple board directorships held by an independent director. Education is the log of the tertiary 
schooling years of an independent director, with 3 years for college education, 4 years for university education, 6 years for master degree education, and 9 years 
for Ph.D. degree. Title is dummy coded 1 if an independent director holds a professional qualification (e.g., accountant, engineer, and economist). SubCommittee 
is the log of the number of subcommittees attended by an independent director. Female is a dummy coded 1 if an independent director is a female and 0 
otherwise. Age is the log of the age of an independent director. Outside Director Ratio is the ratio of the number of independent directors to total number of 
directors. Board Size is the log of the number of directors on board. Central SOE is a dummy coded 1 if a firm is a central SOE. Local SOE is a dummy coded 1 
if a firm is a local SOE. Legal Environment Index shows the degree of legal environment development of the region a firm is located. Firm Size is the log of total 
assets. Leverage is the debt to total asset ratio. ROA is the return on total assets. Firm Age is the log of firm age. Living Expense is the log of the living 
consumption index of the region a firm is located. 
* p 0.05 






Regression Analysis (H1 and H2) 
          
 Pa y Abnormal Pay 
 Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value           
Intercept 3.18 0.00 2.54 0.00 
Multi-Board 0.05 0.00** 0.04 0.00** 
Education 0.02 0.00** 0.02 0.00** 
Title 0.00 0.79 0.01 0.46 
SubCommittee 0.04 0.00** 0.04 0.00** 
Legal Environment Index -0.01 0.02* -0.02 0.00** 
Central SOE 0.01 0.26 0.05 0.00** 
Local SOE -0.07 0.00** -0.06 0.00** 
Female -0.03 0.01** -0.03 0.02* 
Age 0.15 0.00** 0.15 0.00** 
Outside Director Ratio -0.13 0.12 -0.22 0.00** 
Board Size -0.10 0.00** -0.05 0.01** 
Firm Size 0.17 0.00** -0.02 0.00** 
Leverage -0.06 0.02* -0.05 0.06 
ROA 0.51 0.00** 0.31 0.00** 
Firm Age -0.03 0.01** 0.00 0.91 
Living Expense 0.37 0.00** -0.26 0.00** 
Industry Dummies Included     
Year Dummies Included     
Adjusted R-square 0.21  0.05  
F Statistic 111.87  24.78  
p-value 0.00  0.00  
N 15523  15523            
 
Pay is the log of compensation (in RMB) to independent director. Abnormal Pay is the abnormal 
compensation of independent director. Multi-Board is the log of the number of multiple board 
directorships held by an independent director. Education is the log of the tertiary schooling years of an 
independent director, with 3 years for college education, 4 years for university education, 6 years for 
master degree education, and 9 years for Ph.D. degree. Title is dummy coded 1 if an independent 
director holds a professional qualification (e.g., accountant, engineer, and economist). SubCommittee is 
the log of the number of subcommittees attended by an independent director. Legal Environment Index 
shows the degree of legal environment development of the region a firm is located. Central SOE is a 
dummy coded 1 if a firm is a central SOE. Local SOE is a dummy coded 1 if a firm is a local SOE. 
Female is a dummy coded 1 if an independent director is a female and 0 otherwise. Age is the log of the 
age of an independent director. Outside Director Ratio is the ratio of the number of independent 
directors to total number of directors. Board Size is the log of the number of directors on board. Firm 
Size is the log of total assets. Leverage is the debt to total asset ratio. ROA is the return on total assets. 
Firm Age is the log of firm age. Living Expense is the log of the living consumption index of the region a 
firm is located. 
            * p 0.05 






Regression Analysis (H3) 
          
 Pa y Abnormal Pay 
 Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value           
Intercept 3.60 0.00 2.76 0.00 
Multi-Board 0.06 0.00** 0.05 0.00** 
Education 0.03 0.00** 0.03 0.00** 
Title -0.02 0.07 -0.02 0.18 
SubCommittee 0.02 0.01* 0.03 0.00** 
Multi-Board*POE -0.02 0.37 -0.01 0.45 
Education*POE -0.02 0.04* -0.03 0.00** 
Title*POE 0.06 0.00** 0.06 0.00** 
SubCommittee*POE 0.03 0.05* 0.03 0.05* 
Legal Environment Index -0.00 0.93 -0.01 0.04* 
Central SOE 0.05 0.03* 0.07 0.00** 
Local SOE -0.04 0.12 -0.03 0.13 
Female -0.03 0.01** -0.03 0.02* 
Age 0.16 0.00** 0.14 0.00** 
Outside Director Ratio -0.09 0.25 -0.18 0.02* 
Board Size -0.08 0.00** -0.04 0.05* 
Firm Size 0.16 0.00** -0.03 0.00** 
Leverage -0.07 0.00** -0.04 0.12 
ROA 0.53 0.00** 0.31 0.00** 
Firm Age -0.03 0.01** -0.00 0.85 
Living Expense 0.34 0.00** -0.28 0.00** 
Industry Dummies Included     
Year Dummies Included     
Adjusted R-square 0.20  0.05  
F Statistic 111.94  24.18  
p-value 0.00  0.00  
N 15523  15523            
Pay is the log of compensation (in RMB) to independent director. Abnormal Pay is the abnormal 
compensation of independent director. Multi-Board is the log of the number of multiple board 
directorships held by an independent director. Education is the log of the tertiary schooling years of an 
independent director, with 3 years for college education, 4 years for university education, 6 years for 
master degree education, and 9 years for Ph.D. degree. Title is dummy coded 1 if an independent 
director holds a professional qualification (e.g., accountant, engineer, and economist). SubCommittee is 
the log of the number of subcommittees attended by an independent director. Legal Environment Index 
shows the degree of legal environment development of the region a firm is located. Central SOE is a 
dummy coded 1 if a firm is a central SOE. Local SOE is a dummy coded 1 if a firm is a local SOE. 
Female is a dummy coded 1 if an independent director is a female and 0 otherwise. Age is the log of 
the age of an independent director. POE is a dummy coded 1 if a firm is a privately-owned firm and 0 
otherwise. Outside Director Ratio is the ratio of the number of independent directors to total number of 
directors. Board Size is the log of the number of directors on board. Firm Size is the log of total assets. 
Leverage is the debt to total asset ratio. ROA is the return on total assets. Firm Age is the log of firm 
age. Living Expense is the log of the living consumption index of the region a firm is located. 
                * p 0.05 








Regression Analysis (H4) 
Panel A: Dependent Variable = Pay  
                  
 Full  Sample Local  SOEs Central SOEs POEs 
 Pa y Pa y  Pay   Pay  
 Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value                   
Intercept 3.18 0.00 3.21 0.00 3.59 0.00 5.24 0.00 
Multi-Board 0.05 0.00** 0.06 0.00** 0.04 0.04* 0.05 0.00** 
Education 0.02 0.00** 0.03 0.00** 0.03 0.01** 0.00 0.79 
Title 0.00 0.79 -0.03 0.06 0.01 0.72 0.03 0.04* 
SubCommittee 0.04 0.00** 0.03 0.00** 0.01 0.48 0.05 0.00** 
Legal Environment Index -0.01 0.02* -0.02 0.01** 0.01 0.61 0.03 0.02* 
Central SOE 0.01 0.26       
Local SOE -0.07 0.00**       
Female -0.03 0.01** -0.02 0.20 -0.02 0.57 -0.06 0.00** 
Age 0.15 0.00** 0.15 0.00** 0.17 0.00** 0.12 0.00** 
Outside Director Ratio -0.13 0.12 -0.21 0.08 0.58 0.00** -0.32 0.03* 
Board Size -0.10 0.00** -0.03 0.27 -0.33 0.00** -0.03 0.39 
Firm Size 0.17 0.00** 0.16 0.00** 0.18 0.00** 0.14 0.00** 
Leverage -0.06 0.02* -0.01 0.81 -0.21 0.00** -0.04 0.37 
ROA 0.51 0.00** 0.75 0.00** 0.58 0.00** 0.16 0.02* 
Firm Age -0.03 0.01** 0.10 0.00** -0.08 0.00** -0.04 0.00** 
Living Expense 0.37 0.00** 0.34 0.00** 0.33 0.00** 0.21 0.00** 
Industry Dummies 
Included 
        
Year Dummies Included         
Adjusted R-square 0.21  0.21  0.34  0.15  
F Statistic 111.87  65.09  47.31  30.87  
p-value 0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  











Panel B: Dependent Variable = Abnormal Pay  
                  
 Full  Sample Local  SOEs Central SOEs POEs 
 Abnormal Pay Abnormal Pay Abnormal Pay Abnormal Pay  
 Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value                   
Intercept 2.54 0.00 2.28 0.00 2.86 0.00 5.21 0.00 
Multi-Board 0.04 0.00** 0.05 0.00** 0.03 0.04* 0.05 0.00** 
Education 0.02 0.00** 0.04 0.00** 0.03 0.03* 0.00 0.87 
Title 0.01 0.46 -0.02 0.08 0.01 0.51 0.04 0.01** 
SubCommittee 0.04 0.00** 0.04 0.00** 0.00 0.97 0.04 0.00** 
Legal Environment Index -0.02 0.00** -0.02 0.00** 0.01 0.37 0.02 0.03* 
Central SOE 0.05 0.00**       
Local SOE -0.06 0.00**       
Female -0.03 0.02* -0.02 0.18 -0.01 0.61 -0.05 0.01** 
Age 0.15 0.00** 0.14 0.00** 0.17 0.00** 0.12 0.00** 
Outside Director Ratio -0.22 0.00** -0.24 0.04* 0.53 0.00** -0.57 0.00** 
Board Size -0.05 0.01** 0.01 0.63 -0.16 0.00** -0.04 0.24 
Firm Size -0.02 0.00** -0.03 0.00** -0.01 0.08 -0.05 0.00** 
Leverage -0.05 0.06 -0.05 0.21 -0.12 0.04* 0.05 0.27 
ROA 0.31 0.00** 0.48 0.00** 0.27 0.17 0.07 0.33 
Firm Age 0.00 0.91 0.10 0.00** -0.01 0.71 -0.04 0.00** 
Living Expense -0.26 0.00** -0.26 0.00** -0.33 0.00** -0.49 0.00** 
Industry Dummies 
Included 
        
Year Dummies Included         
Adjusted R-square 0.05  0.06  0.06  0.07  
F Statistic 24.78  16.81  6.86  14.66  
p-value 0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  
N 15523  7063  2829  5631           
Pay is the log of compensation (in RMB) to independent director. Abnormal Pay is the abnormal compensation of independent director. Multi-Board 
is the log of the number of multiple board directorships held by an independent director. Education is the log of the tertiary schooling years of an 
independent director, with 3 years for college education, 4 years for university education, 6 years for master degree education, and 9 years for Ph.D. 
degree. Title is dummy coded 1 if an independent director holds a professional qualification (e.g., accountant, engineer, and economist). 
SubCommittee is the log of the number of subcommittees attended by an independent director. Legal Environment Index shows the degree of legal 
environment development of the region a firm is located. Central SOE is a dummy coded 1 if a firm is a central SOE. Local SOE is a dummy coded 1 
if a firm is a local SOE. Female is a dummy coded 1 if an independent director is a female and 0 otherwise. Age is the log of the age of an 
independent director. Outside Director Ratio is the ratio of the number of independent directors to total number of directors. Board Size is the log of 
the number of directors on board. Firm Size is the log of total assets. Leverage is the debt to total asset ratio. ROA is the return on total assets. Firm 
Age is the log of firm age. Living Expense is the log of the living consumption index of the region a firm is located. 
            * p 0.05 
** p 0.01 
